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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 12-2316 
________________ 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
DANIEL CASTELLI, 
 
Appellant 
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(Crim. No. 2-92-00132-06) 
District Judge: Honorable J. Curtis Joyner 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 19, 2013 
 
 
Before:  AMBRO and SMITH, Circuit Judges,  
and O’CONNOR, Associate Justice (Ret.) 
 
 
 
(Opinion filed: January 7, 2014) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION 
________________ 
                                              

 Honorable Sandra Day O’Connor, Associate Justice (Retired), Supreme Court of the 
United States, sitting by designation.  
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 Appellant Daniel Castelli was charged with violating the terms of his supervised 
release.  In preparation for his revocation hearing, Castelli made various discovery 
requests, all of which were denied.  The District Court sentenced Castelli to two years’ 
imprisonment, to be followed by a new term of supervised release.  He appeals, 
contending that the Court’s denial of his discovery requests violated his right to due 
process, and that its sentence violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.      
I. Background  
 In September 1992, Castelli pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess 
“P2P” with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  
The District Court sentenced Castelli to 240 months’ imprisonment, ten years of 
supervised release, and a $10,000 criminal fine.  He completed his custodial sentence 
and, on September 18, 2009, began serving his term of supervised release.  In December  
2011, the Probation Office filed a Violation of Supervised Release (“VOSR”) petition, 
contending that Castelli had violated his release conditions by: A) committing a new drug 
offense (trafficking oxycodone); B) failing to make payments toward his fine; C) failing 
to report for drug testing and failing to submit monthly supervision reports; D) submitting 
multiple drug-positive urine specimens; and E) associating with convicted felons.  The 
Probation Office filed an amended violation of supervised release petition alleging two 
additional violations – F) that Castelli was arrested for possessing two “baggies” of crack 
cocaine, and G) that he had submitted additional drug-positive urine specimens.  The 
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District Court scheduled a hearing.  In preparation for it, Castelli filed several motions for 
discovery.  As noted, all were denied.  
 At the conclusion of that hearing, the District Court found that Castelli had 
violated the conditions of his supervised release by engaging in drug trafficking, as 
charged in section A of the VOSR petition; failing to report for drug testing, as charged 
in section C of the petition; failing several drug tests, as charged in section D of the 
petition and section G of the amended petition; associating with felons, as charged in 
section E of the petition; and possessing crack cocaine, as charged in section F of the 
amended petition.  The Court revoked Castelli’s existing term of supervised release, and 
sentenced him to a custodial term of 24 months to be followed by a seven-year term of 
supervised release.  
 Castelli filed a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a) alleging 
that the District Court’s order that he serve a seven-year term of supervised release after 
completing his custodial sentence violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.  
The District Court denied the motion, and Castelli appeals. He reasserts his Ex Post Facto 
Clause argument, and also contends that his due process rights were violated because he 
did not receive adequate discovery during the revocation proceedings.
1
  
II. Discussion 
 We review the District Court’s ruling on a discovery motion for abuse of 
discretion.  See United States v. Liebert, 519 F.2d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 1973).  We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s determination that its imposition of a seven-year 
                                              
1
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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term of supervised release to follow the 24-month term of reimprisonment did not violate 
the Ex Post Facto Clause.  See United States v. Brady, 88 F.3d 225, 227 (3d Cir. 1996).   
A. Discovery Motions 
 Revocation of supervised release proceedings are subject to only “minimum 
requirements of due process.”  United States v. Maloney, 513 F.3d 350, 356 (3d Cir. 
2008) (internal quotation omitted).  With respect to discovery, due process and Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1 (which governs revocation of supervised release 
proceedings) require only that a defendant receive “disclosure of the evidence against 
him.”  United States v. Derewal, 66 F.3d 52, 55 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 
32.1(b)(2)(B).   
 Here, the Government fully disclosed to Castelli the evidence it intended to use 
against him at the revocation hearing.  Sections A and E of the VOSR petition charged 
Castelli with trafficking oxycodone and associating with felons.  With regard to these 
sections, the Government provided Castelli with recordings and summaries of his 
intercepted telephone calls, copies of wiretap applications, copies of relevant surveillance 
reports, and copies of oxycodone prescription records.  It also relied on the testimony of 
Agent Christopher Galletti of the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Office.  Because 
Agent Galletti was unavailable on the hearing date, the Government introduced Galletti’s 
previously videotaped deposition, in which Castelli and his counsel had participated.  
Violations C and D of the VOSR petition and violation G of the amended petition 
charged Castelli with failing to report for certain drug tests and testing positive during 
other drug tests.  The violation petitions informed Castelli of the dates of both the missed 
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and positive tests.  Additionally, Probation Officer Carmen Vasquez-Ongay, who 
testified at the hearing, gave Castelli – on the morning of the hearing – a log of test 
results and a copy of the positive test reports.  Castelli and his counsel had the 
opportunity to examine these documents during the Court’s lunch recess, after which 
Officer Vasquez-Ongay resumed her testimony. Violation F of the amended VOSR 
petition related to Castelli’s arrest for possession of crack cocaine.  Prior to the hearing, 
the Government provided him with a copy of the arrest report prepared by the arresting 
officer, Michael Policella.  At the hearing, Officer Policella testified consistently with 
that report.  Thus, the record shows that, in accord with Rule 32.1(b)(2), the Government 
timely provided Castelli with all the evidence against him relating to the alleged 
violations of supervised release.  
 Castelli argues that he was entitled to “[r]eview the U.S. Probation Office’s file, 
receive a copy of his Pre-Sentence Investigation Report . . ., and a more timely 
production of the Drug Test Results being used against him.”  Appellant’s Br. at 17.    
He has, however, failed to identify any part of the Probation Office’s file that he was not 
permitted to examine in time to defend adequately against the violation petition.  Insofar 
as he contends that he was entitled to review the entire Probation Office file, this 
argument is contradicted by case law.  See Derewal, 66 F.2d at 55 (nothing “require[s] 
automatic production of a probation officer’s entire file, even where the officer is a 
witness”).   
 Castelli, relying on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(e)(3), next argues that 
he was entitled to production of the presentence report that was prepared for his 1993 
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sentencing.  As an initial matter, Rule 32 applies only to sentencing following a 
conviction by a verdict or plea, not to sentencing in connection with revocation 
proceedings.  Unavailing is Castelli’s argument that he sought the presentence report “so 
as to assess the legal basis for [his underlying] conviction as well as the possible 
consequences of sentencing at the Revocation Hearing.” Appellant’s Br. at 15.  The 
validity of Castelli’s initial conviction, which had been final for nearly twenty years, was 
not at issue in the revocation proceedings.  Similarly, Castelli did not need to review the 
presentence report to learn the classification of his initial offense and his criminal history 
category because, as the District Court correctly noted, it could take judicial notice of that 
information.  See Supp. App. 2.  Finally, though Castelli did not receive the Drug Test 
Results until the day of the hearing, nothing in the record indicates that the documents 
were lengthy or complex.  Castelli and his counsel had over an hour to review the 
documents prior to cross-examining Probation Officer Vasquez-Ongay, and at no time 
during the proceeding did Castelli complain that this was insufficient time.  Accordingly, 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Castelli’s motions for discovery.  
 Even if the District Court had erred in denying the discovery motions, Castelli is 
not entitled to relief on appeal.  He cannot establish that he was prejudiced by the District 
Court’s order, especially in light of his own admission at the hearing that he had violated 
various conditions of his supervised release.  See App. at 52-53; see also United States v. 
Davis, 397 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2005) (prejudice that must be shown to justify reversal 
for a discovery violation is a likelihood that verdict would have been different had 
Government complied with discovery rules).   
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Ex Post Facto Clause 
 Castelli next argues that the District Court sentence violates the Ex Post Facto 
Clause of the Constitution.  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3 (“No . . . ex post facto Law shall 
be passed”).  When determining whether a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause 
occurred, we consider whether a current law is more punitive than one in effect on the 
date of the offense.  See, e.g., Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2081 (2013).  
Though Castelli’s brief is less than clear, the violation he seems to be identifying is the 
District Court’s imposition of  a second, seven-year term of supervised release after 
Castelli’s 24-month reincarceration for violating the conditions of his first term of 
supervised release.  At the time Castelli committed his prior offense, former Section 
3583(e) of Title 18 governed the penalties available on revocation of a supervised release 
term.  That section authorized a district court to 
 revoke a term of supervised release, and require the person to serve in prison all or 
 part of the term of supervised release without credit for time previously served 
 on postrelease supervision, if [the court] finds by a preponderance of the evidence 
 that the person violated a condition of supervised release, pursuant to the 
 provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that are applicable to 
 probation revocation and to the provisions of applicable policy statements issued 
 by the Sentencing Commission, except that a person whose term is revoked under 
 this paragraph may not be required to serve more than 3 years in prison if the 
 offense for which the person was convicted was a Class B felony, or more than 2 
 years in prison if the offense was a Class C or D felony.  
 
The section was amended in 1994 to add a new subsection expressly permitting a district 
court to impose an additional term of supervised release after revoking the prior term of 
supervised release and sentencing a defendant to imprisonment: 
 Supervised release following revocation. – When a term of supervised release 
 is revoked and the defendant is required to serve a term of imprisonment, the court 
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 may include a requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised 
 release after imprisonment.  The length of such a term of supervised release shall 
 not exceed the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that 
 resulted in the original term of supervised release, less any term of imprisonment 
 that was imposed upon revocation of supervised release.  
 
18 U.S.C. § 3583(h). 
 Castelli’s argument appears to be that, by revoking his supervised release and 
sentencing him to imprisonment followed by an additional term of supervised release, the 
District Court relied on 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h), a subsection that was enacted after 
Castelli’s initial offense and sentencing.  Accordingly, he contends that the District 
Court’s sentence violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.  This argument is foreclosed by 
Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000).  There the Supreme Court specifically 
held that the version of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) in effect at the time of Castelli’s sentencing 
permitted a district court to impose a new term of supervised release after revocation and 
imprisonment for violating an initial term of supervised release.  Id. at 712-13.  Thus, 
Castelli’s argument that the District Court’s sentence implicates ex post facto concerns 
fails. 
 For these reasons, we affirm. 
 
